

Rational Inference and Defeasible Reasoning in Formal Concept Analysis

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1984 Congressional Voting Records

Implications

- $R, w \rightarrow p$
- $R, a \rightarrow p$
- $D, h, p \rightarrow w$
- $D, R \rightarrow \perp$

Too strict for noisy or
exception-prone data

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>
79	×		×		×	
62	×		×	×	×	
34	×			×	×	
3	×			×		×
65		×				×
55		×		×		×
...	...					

$A \rightarrow B$ **holds** if every object with A has B .

- *D*: Democrat
- *h*: handicapped infants
- *w*: water project cost sharing
- *R*: Republican
- *p*: physician fee freeze
- *a*: adoption of the budget resolution

1984 Congressional Voting Records

Association rules

- $R, w \rightarrow p$
- $R, a \rightarrow p$
- $D, h, p \rightarrow w$
- $D, R \rightarrow \perp$
- $a \rightarrow D$ (91%)
- $D \rightarrow a$ (87%)
- $R \rightarrow p$ (97%)
- $p \rightarrow R$ (92%)
- ...

$A \rightarrow B$ holds with confidence γ if $\gamma \cdot 100$ % of objects with A have B .

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79	×		×		×	
62	×		×	×	×	
34	×			×	×	
3	×			×		×
65		×				×
55		×		×		×
...	...					

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1984 Congressional Voting Records


Defeasible Conditionals

Treat some objects as less typical than others

- $D \sim a$
- $p \sim R$
- $w \sim D$
- $w, p \not\sim D$

Non-monotonic

$A \sim B$ (defeasibly) holds if the most typical objects with A have B .



#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>
79	×		×		×	
65		×				×
62	×		×	×	×	
55		×		×		×
34	×			×	×	
3	×			×		×

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Why Not Go with Association Rules?

Fix a threshold γ and say that $A \sim B$ holds if $A \rightarrow B$ holds with confidence at least γ .

- For $\gamma = 0.51$, we have $w \sim D$ but $w, p \not\sim D$.

If typical objects with A have B and C , they should have $B \cup C$.

- However, $\text{conf}(a \rightarrow h) > \text{conf}(a \rightarrow w) > 0.51$,
but $\text{conf}(a \rightarrow h, w) < 0.51$.

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>
79	×		×		×	
62	×		×	×	×	
34	×			×	×	
3	×			×		×
65		×				×
55		×		×		×

So, $a \sim h$ and $a \sim w$,
but $a \not\sim h, w$

KLM Postulates

for Rational Consequence Relations

$$\text{(REF)} \quad \frac{}{\phi \sim \phi}$$

$$\text{(LLE)} \quad \frac{\phi \equiv \psi, \quad \psi \sim \gamma}{\phi \sim \gamma}$$

$$\text{(AND)} \quad \frac{\phi \sim \psi, \quad \phi \sim \gamma}{\phi \sim \psi \wedge \gamma}$$

$$\text{(CUT)} \quad \frac{\phi \wedge \psi \sim \gamma, \quad \phi \sim \psi}{\phi \sim \gamma}$$

$$\text{(RW)} \quad \frac{\psi \rightarrow \gamma, \quad \phi \sim \psi}{\phi \sim \gamma}$$

$$\text{(OR)} \quad \frac{\phi \sim \gamma, \quad \psi \sim \gamma}{\phi \vee \psi \sim \gamma}$$

$$\text{(CM)} \quad \frac{\phi \sim \psi, \quad \phi \sim \gamma}{\phi \wedge \psi \sim \gamma}$$

$$\text{(RM)} \quad \frac{\phi \sim \psi, \quad \phi \not\sim \neg \gamma}{\phi \wedge \gamma \sim \psi}$$

A consequence relation \sim is **rational** if it satisfies these postulates.

Defeasible Conditionals in Formal Concept Analysis

Formal Concept Analysis

(Ganter, Wille 2024)

- **Def:** A **formal context** is a triple $\mathbb{K} = (G, M, I)$, where G is a set of objects, M is a set of attributes, and $I \subseteq G \times M$.
- **Def:** For $A \subseteq G$ and $B \subseteq M$,
 $A' = \{m \in M \mid \forall g \in A: (g, m) \in I\}$ $B' = \{g \in G \mid \forall m \in B: (g, m) \in I\}$
- **Def:** For $X, Y \subseteq M$, an implication $X \rightarrow Y$ holds in \mathbb{K} if $X' \subseteq Y'$. $\mathbb{K} \models X \rightarrow Y$

Formal Concept Analysis

Defeasible Conditionals

- **Def:** A **ranked formal context** $\mathbb{R} = (G, M, I, R)$ is a formal context (G, M, I) supplied with a ranking function $R: G \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$.
- **Def:** $\underline{A} := \{g \in A \mid \forall h \in A: R(g) \leq R(h)\}$ are the most typical objects in $A \subseteq G$.
- **Def:** A **defeasible conditional** $A \sim B$ **holds** in \mathbb{R} if $\underline{A}' \subseteq B'$. $\mathbb{R} \models A \sim B$
- **Def:** An object $g \in G$ **respects** $A \sim B$ if $g \notin A'$ or $g \in B'$.
- **Def:** An object $g \in G$ **supports** $A \sim B$ if $g \in (A \cup B)'$.

Formal Concept Analysis

Compound attributes

The KLM postulates must be satisfied even with **compound attributes** in the context.

(OR)
$$\frac{\phi \sim \gamma, \quad \psi \sim \gamma}{\phi \vee \psi \sim \gamma}$$

(RM)
$$\frac{\phi \sim \psi, \quad \phi \not\sim \neg\gamma}{\phi \wedge \gamma \sim \psi}$$

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>h</i> ∨ <i>w</i>	¬ <i>a</i>
79	×		×		×		×	
62	×		×	×	×		×	
34	×			×	×		×	
3	×			×		×	×	×
65		×				×		×
55		×		×		×	×	×

Defeasible Conditionals

in Ranked Contexts

- **Prop:** Defeasible conditionals of a ranked context satisfy the KLM postulates for rational consequence relations.
- **Thm:** A consequence relation \vdash is rational if and only if it is induced by a ranked context.

Non-monotonic Entailment in Formal Concept Analysis

Given a formal context and a set of defeasible conditionals, what else can be inferred?

Determining the Typicality

from Background Knowledge

- Start with background defeasible conditionals—your subjective view of the domain.
- Rank objects based on how well they agree with these conditionals.
- Do not treat an object as less typical than necessary.
- **Def:** For a set Δ of defeasible conditionals, a context (G, M, I) is Δ -compatible if there is a ranked context (G, M, I, R) where all conditionals from Δ hold.

Contextual Rational Closure

- **Def:** For ranked contexts $\mathbb{R}_1 = (G, M, I, R_1)$ and $\mathbb{R}_2 = (G, M, I, R_2)$,

$$\mathbb{R}_1 \leq \mathbb{R}_2 \iff \forall g \in G: R_1(g) \leq R_2(g)$$

- **Prop:** For every Δ and Δ -compatible $\mathbb{K} = (G, M, I)$, there is a unique \leq -minimum ranked context (G, M, I, R) satisfying Δ . We denote it by $\mathbb{R}_{\min}(\mathbb{K}, \Delta)$.

- **Def:** $\mathbb{K}, \Delta \models A \sim B \iff \mathbb{R}_{\min}(\mathbb{K}, \Delta) \models A \sim B$

$A \sim B$ is in the **rational closure** of Δ w.r.t. \mathbb{K}

Contextual Rational Closure

- Given
 - a set Δ of defeasible conditionals
 - and a Δ -compatible context \mathbb{K} ,
- rank \mathbb{K} 's objects as typical as possible to form a ranked context that satisfies Δ ,
- include in the rational closure of Δ w.r.t. \mathbb{K} all conditionals that hold in this context.

Determining the Typicality

Object Rank

$\Delta:$ $D \vdash a$ $w \vdash D$ $w, p \vdash R$

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
79	×		×		×		
62	×		×	×	×		
34	×			×	×		
3	×			×		×	
65		×				×	
55		×		×		×	

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

$\Delta:$ $D \vdash a$ $w \vdash D$ $w, p \vdash R$

- Find objects that respect Δ .

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
79	×		×		×		
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34	×			×	×		
3	×			×		×	
65		×				×	
55		×		×		×	

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

$\Delta: \quad D \models a \quad w \models D \quad w, p \models R$

- Find objects that respect Δ .
- Assign them rank 0.

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
79	×		×		×		0
62	×		×	×	×		0
34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

$\Delta:$ $D \vdash a$ $w \vdash D$ $w, p \vdash R$

- Find objects that respect Δ .
- Assign them rank 0.
- Remove conditionals supported by 0-rank objects.

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
79	×		×		×		0
62	×		×	×	×		0
34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

$\Delta:$ $D \vdash a$ $w \vdash D$ $w, p \vdash R$

- Find objects that respect Δ .
- Assign them rank 0.
- Remove conditionals supported by 0-rank objects.
- Find unranked objects that respect the modified Δ .

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62	×		×	×	×		0
34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

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- Find objects that respect Δ .
- Assign them rank 0.
- Remove conditionals supported by 0-rank objects.
- Find unranked objects that respect the modified Δ .
- Assign them rank 1.

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
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62	×		×	×	×		0
34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

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- Find objects that respect Δ .
- Assign them rank 0.
- Remove conditionals supported by 0-rank objects.
- Find unranked objects that respect the modified Δ .
- Assign them rank 1.
- And so on.

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62	×		×	×	×		0
34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	2
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

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3	×			×		×	2
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

If Δ is not empty and there are unranked objects none of which respects Δ , then \mathbb{K} is not Δ -compatible.

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

Δ : $D \vdash a$ $w \vdash D$ $w, p \vdash R$

- Find objects that respect Δ .
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34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	2
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Given Δ and a Δ -compatible \mathbb{K} ,
ObjectRank computes $\mathbb{R}_{\min}(\mathbb{K}, \Delta)$.

Determining the Typicality

ObjectRank Algorithm

Δ : $D \vdash a$ $w \vdash D$ $w, p \vdash R$

- Find objects that respect Δ .
- Assign them rank 0.
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34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	2
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Runtime: $O(|G|^2 |\Delta|)$

Contextual Rational Closure

$\Delta:$ $D \sim a$ $w \sim D$ $w, p \sim R$
 \Rightarrow $p \sim R$

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
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3	×			×		×	2
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Contextual Rational Closure

$\Delta:$ $D \sim a$ $w \sim D$ $w, p \sim R$

\Rightarrow $p \sim R$ $w, p \not\sim D$

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
79	×		×		×		0
62	×		×	×	×		0
34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	2
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Contextual Rational Closure

Non-monotonicity

$\Delta:$ $D \sim a$ $w \sim D$ $w, p \sim R$

\Rightarrow $p \sim R$ $w, p \not\sim D$

$\Delta:$ $w \sim D$

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
79	×		×		×		0
62	×		×	×	×		0
34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	0
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Contextual Rational Closure

Non-monotonicity

$\Delta:$ $D \sim a$ $w \sim D$ $w, p \sim R$

\Rightarrow $p \sim R$ $w, p \not\sim D$

$\Delta:$ $w \sim D$

\Rightarrow $p \not\sim R$

#Congressmen	<i>D</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>p</i>	Rank
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34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	0
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Contextual Rational Closure

Non-monotonicity

$\Delta:$ $D \sim a$ $w \sim D$ $w, p \sim R$

\Rightarrow $p \sim R$ $w, p \not\sim D$

$\Delta:$ $w \sim D$

\Rightarrow $p \not\sim R$ $w, p \sim D$

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34	×			×	×		0
3	×			×		×	0
65		×				×	0
55		×		×		×	1

Rational Closure

Context vs No Context

Recall: $\mathbb{K}, \Delta \models A \sim B \iff \mathbb{R}_{\min}(\mathbb{K}, \Delta) \models A \sim B$

$A \sim B$ is in the **rational closure** of Δ w.r.t. \mathbb{K}

- The context \mathbb{K} specifies background knowledge for the entailment relation by listing the allowed attribute combinations.
- For context-agnostic entailment, include all possible attribute combinations into \mathbb{K} .

Conclusion

- We introduced defeasible conditionals into FCA via ranked contexts
 - $A \sim B$ doesn't imply $A \cup C \sim B$
- They satisfy the KLM postulates for rational consequence relations
- We defined contextual non-monotonic entailment for defeasible conditionals
 - $\Delta_1 \models A \sim B$ doesn't mean that $\Delta_1 \cup \Delta_2 \models A \sim B$
- Next:
 - Complexity of context-agnostic entailment
 - Typical concepts and the corresponding concept lattices
 - Other types of defeasible entailment