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Non-Monotonic Reasoning I

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A Fundamental Limitation of FOL

Humans constantly face the necessity of making decisions:

What flight should I take?, What should I study?, What kind of surgery does this patient need?, ...

Ideally, we would

1. Start with sufficient information about the problem:

All direct and non-direct flights from London to Shanghai, their prices, flight length, and seat availability

2. Apply logical reasoning to draw a conclusion:

The cheapest, shortest flight is with Virgin from LHR at 2pm.

3. Use the conclusion to make an informed decision:

Buy tickets for the relevant flight

A Fundamental Limitation of FOL

FOL Knowledge Representation addresses this ideal situation:

1. We gather information
2. We represent it in a knowledge base
3. We pose queries and get answers using reasoning

But in reality, we may not have sufficient information.

Our decision making is sometimes based on common sense assumptions, rather than on FOL derivable conclusions:

- *If the LHR website shows no departing flight from London to Shanghai at 2pm, then there is no such flight.*
- *Typically, the human heart is on the left side of the body.*

A Fundamental Limitation of FOL

Consider the statement

"Typically, humans have their heart on the left side of the body."

If I am a doctor and meet Mary Jones for the first time, I would conclude in the absence of additional information that

"Mary Jones's heart is on the left side of her body."

However, there is a rare condition, called *situs inversus*, in which the heart is mirrored from its usual position (*situs solitus*).

If I examine her and discover that her heart is on the right, I should revise my previous conclusion and deduce that she has *situs inversus*.

A Fundamental Limitation of FOL

Suppose I try to model the previous situation in FOL:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x.(\text{Human}(x) \rightarrow \exists y.(\text{hasOrg}(x, y) \wedge \text{Heart}(y))) \\ \forall x.(\text{Heart}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{SitSolHeart}(x) \vee \text{SitInvHeart}(x)) \\ \forall x.(\text{SitSolHeart}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{Heart}(x) \wedge \text{hasLocation}(x, \text{left})) \\ \forall x.(\text{SitInvHeart}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{Heart}(x) \wedge \text{hasLocation}(x, \text{right})) \\ \forall x.(\text{hasLocation}(x, \text{left}) \wedge \text{hasLocation}(x, \text{right}) \rightarrow \perp) \\ \forall x.(\text{SitInvPatient}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{Human}(x) \wedge \exists y.(\text{hasOrg}(x, y) \wedge \text{SitInvHeart}(y))) \\ \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{Human}(\text{MaryJones}) \end{aligned}$$

KB does **not** entail either of the following (not enough info):

$$\text{SitInvPatient}(\text{MaryJones}) \quad \neg \text{SitInvPatient}(\text{MaryJones})$$

In particular, for *M/JH* Mary Jones's heart, the KB entails neither of:

$$\text{hasLocation}(\text{M/JH}, \text{right}) \quad \neg \text{hasLocation}(\text{M/JH}, \text{right})$$

A Fundamental Limitation of FOL

$$\begin{aligned}\forall x.(\text{Human}(x) \rightarrow \exists y.(\text{hasOrg}(x, y) \wedge \text{Heart}(y))) \\ \forall x.(\text{Heart}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{SitSolHeart}(x) \vee \text{SitInvHeart}(x)) \\ \forall x.(\text{SitSolHeart}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{Heart}(x) \wedge \text{hasLocation}(x, \text{left})) \\ \forall x.(\text{SitInvHeart}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{Heart}(x) \wedge \text{hasLocation}(x, \text{right})) \\ \forall x.(\text{hasLocation}(x, \text{left}) \wedge \text{hasLocation}(x, \text{right}) \rightarrow \perp) \\ \forall x.(\text{SitInvPatient}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{Human}(x) \wedge \exists y.(\text{hasOrg}(x, y) \wedge \text{SitInvHeart}(y))) \\ \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{Human}(\text{MaryJones})\end{aligned}$$

To deduce $\neg \text{SitInvPatient}(\text{MaryJones})$, we could add the facts:

$\text{Heart}(\text{MJH}) \quad \text{hasOrg}(\text{MaryJones}, \text{MJH}) \quad \text{hasLocation}(\text{MJH}, \text{left})$

But then, when I examine the patient I should add new evidence

$\text{hasLocation}(\text{MJH}, \text{right})$

Problem: The KB is now unsatisfiable.

A Fundamental Limitation of FOL

In FOL, we cannot ...

1. ... draw “default” or “common sense” conclusions.
2. ... withdraw conclusions when presented with new evidence.

Knowledge that is represented in FOL is “certain”.


- If a sentence is not entailed, it is **not known**.
Nothing can be assumed “by default”.
- If new information contradicts existing information, we get **unsatisfiability**.
Our only choice is to **modify the KB manually**.

This is due to a property of FOL (entailment) called **monotonicity**.

Monotonicity of FOL

Take sets \mathcal{K} and \mathcal{K}' of FOL sentences, with $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{K}'$:

1. every model of \mathcal{K}' is a model of \mathcal{K} ;
2. thus if $\mathcal{K} \models a$, then $\mathcal{K}' \models a$.



By adding FOL sentences to a knowledge base we gain knowledge:

- Reduce the set of models
- Increase the set of consequences (recall entailment definition)

Introducing Non-monotonicity: CWA

Departures data for all London airports between 1pm and 2pm:

flight(LHR, Paris)

flight(LGW, Doha)

flight(LUT, Madrid)

flight(LGW, Johannesburg)

flight(LHR, Beijing)

flight(STD, Athens)

Since the data do not include a Shanghai flight, it is reasonable to assume that there is no such flight.

This is called the **Closed World Assumption (CWA)**.

CWA can be thought of as a “rule” that produces new consequences:

“If something is **not** provably true, then assume that it is false.”

We can use the CWA rule to deduce, for example, that $\neg \text{flight(LHR, Shanghai)}$.

The CWA rule is **non-monotonic**:

If the data is extended with the fact *flight(LHR, Shanghai)*, then the CWA no longer allows for the above deduction.

Introducing Non-monotonicity: Defaults

Consider our example about situs inversus. Suppose we extend our original KB with the following default:

$$\frac{\text{hasOrg}(x, y) \wedge \text{Heart}(y) \text{ and not provably true } \neg \text{hasLocation}(y, \text{left})}{\text{deduce hasLocation}(y, \text{left})}$$

It formalises the fact that "*typically, the human heart is on the left side.*"

If we extended our KB with such a rule we would infer

$$\neg \text{SitInvPatient}(\text{MaryJones})$$

Defaults are non-monotonic:

If we find out that $\text{hasLocation}(\text{MJH}, \text{right})$ is true, then the previous entailment no longer holds w.r.t. our KB and default.

The Need for Non-monotonic Logics

In formal terms,

- FOL has a **monotonic entailment relation** \models :

$$\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{K}' \text{ and } \mathcal{K} \models \alpha \text{ implies } \mathcal{K}' \models \alpha$$

- A **non-monotonic entailment relation** \models is one such that there exist \mathcal{K}' , $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{K}'$ and α such that $\mathcal{K} \models \alpha$, but $\mathcal{K}' \not\models \alpha$.

There is **nothing esoteric** about non-monotonic reasoning.

In fact our everyday reasoning is often non-monotonic!

But as logicians we should insist on:

- well defined syntax and semantics,
- well understood computational properties,
- semantics that induce a **“reasonable”** non-monotonic entailment relation
 - one that is consistent with our intuitions.

Our next question is, how to define such a logic?

The Semantics of FOL Entailment

There are many ways to define a non-monotonic logic from (a fragment of) FOL. We will focus only on one of them.

Idea: Take into account only a subset of **preferred models** of \mathcal{K} (instead of all models) when checking whether $\mathcal{K} \models a$.

- Monotonic entailment:

$\mathcal{K} \models a$ iff **every (FOL) model** of \mathcal{K} is a model of a .

- Non-monotonic entailment:

$\mathcal{K} \models a$ iff **every preferred (FOL) model** of \mathcal{K} is a model of a .

The non-monotonic entailment relation \models is **supra-classical**:

Using \models we will always derive **more consequences** than using \models .

Key problem: How to specify which models are preferred?

Preferred Models

Coming back to our flight knowledge base \mathcal{K} :

flight(LHR, Paris)

flight(LGW, Doha)

flight(LUT, Madrid)

flight(LGW, Johannesburg)

flight(LHR, Beijing)

flight(STD, Athens)

This set of ground literals has infinitely many FOL models, and

$\mathcal{K} \not\models \neg \text{flight}(LHR, Shanghai)$

Here is a (Herbrand) counter-model $\mathcal{J} \not\models \neg \text{flight}(LHR, Shanghai)$:

$$\text{flight}^{\mathcal{J}} = \{ \quad (LHR, Paris), (LGW, Johannesburg), \\ (LGW, Doha), (LHR, Beijing), \\ (LUT, Madrid), (STD, Athens), \\ (LHR, Shanghai) \quad \}$$

Preferred Models

Note, however, that there is a special Herbrand model, namely the one that coincides with the set of facts:

$$\text{flight}^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} = \{ (LHR, \text{Paris}), (LGW, \text{Johannesburg}), \\ (LGW, \text{Doha}), (LHR, \text{Beijing}), \\ (LUT, \text{Madrid}), (STD, \text{Athens}) \}$$

This model \mathcal{I}_{min} is the intersection of all Herbrand models of \mathcal{K} , and it is called the **least Herbrand model** of \mathcal{K} .

Suppose we specify \approx by defining the set of preferred models as

$$\text{Preferred}(\mathcal{K}) = \{\mathcal{I}_{min}\}$$

Clearly $\mathcal{K} \approx \neg \text{flight}(LHR, \text{Shanghai})$.

More generally, our entailment relation \approx captures the CWA.

Preferred Models

Our strategy of selecting the least Herbrand model as preferred seemed plausible: We correctly captured the CWA (in this example).

Our example was, however, a bit too simplistic:

The KB only contained positive, ground literals.

Problem: FOL KBs may not have least Herbrand models

$$\forall x.(\text{Heart}(x) \rightarrow \text{SitSolHeart}(x) \vee \text{SitInvHeart}(x))$$

$$\forall x.(\text{SitSolHeart}(x) \wedge \text{SitInvHeart}(x) \rightarrow \perp)$$

$$\text{Heart}(a)$$

We have only two Herbrand models:

$$\mathcal{J}_1 : \text{Heart}^{\mathcal{J}_1} = \{a\}, \text{SitSolHeart}^{\mathcal{J}_1} = \{a\}$$

$$\mathcal{J}_2 : \text{Heart}^{\mathcal{J}_2} = \{a\}, \text{SitInvHeart}^{\mathcal{J}_2} = \{a\}$$

Their intersection is not a model of our KB.

Coming Back to Datalog

Bad news: Things could get much more complicated.

Good news: Datalog is a nice logic with least Herbrand Models.

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x. (JuvArthritis(x) \rightarrow JuvDisease(x)) \\ \forall x. (\forall y. (JuvDisease(x) \wedge Affects(x, y) \rightarrow Child(y))) \\ JuvArthritis(JRA) \\ Affects(JRA, John) \end{aligned}$$

The above KB has a least Herbrand model:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I}_{min} : JuvArthritis^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} = \{JRA\}, Affects^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} = \{(JRA, John)\}, \\ JuvDisease^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} = \{JRA\}, Child^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} = \{John\} \end{aligned}$$

And we have a way to compute it: **forward-chaining**.

Coming Back to Datalog

So, what is the difference with Datalog under monotonic semantics?

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x. (\text{JuvArthritis}(x) \rightarrow \text{JuvDisease}(x)) \\ \forall x. (\forall y. (\text{JuvDisease}(x) \wedge \text{Affects}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{Child}(y))) \\ &\quad \text{JuvArthritis(JRA)} \\ &\quad \text{Affects(JRA, John)} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I}_{min} : \text{JuvArthritis}^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} &= \{\text{JRA}\}, \text{Affects}^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} = \{(\text{JRA}, \text{John})\}, \\ \text{JuvDisease}^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} &= \{\text{JRA}\}, \text{Child}^{\mathcal{I}_{min}} = \{\text{John}\} \end{aligned}$$

No difference with respect to entailment of positive literals:

$$\mathcal{K} \models \text{Child}(\text{John}) \qquad \mathcal{K} \not\models \text{Child}(\text{John})$$

Very different w.r.t. entailment of negative literals (CWA):

$$\mathcal{K} \not\models \neg \text{Child}(\text{JRA}) \qquad \mathcal{K} \not\models \neg \text{Child}(\text{JRA})$$

Limitations

We have successfully formalised CWA in a useful FOL fragment.

However, we have just seen the tip of the iceberg:

1. We still do not know what to do with FOL fragments not having least Herbrand models
2. Datalog with non-monotonic semantics is not sufficiently expressive to represent default statements

$hasOrg(x,y) \wedge Heart(y) \text{ & not provably true } \neg hasLocation(y, \text{left})$
deduce $hasLocation(y, \text{left})$

So, we have reached a crossroads:

1. We need logics beyond Datalog to express defaults.
2. It is not clear how to define \approx for those fragments.

Conclusion

- Entailment in “classical” first-order predicate logic is monotonic.
- This makes it hard to model making and withdrawing assumptions.
- A **model theory** for non-monotonic reasoning can be obtained by restricting \models to **preferred** models.
- A natural way to define preferred models is using the least Herbrand model *if it exists*.
- We used this fact to formalise the **closed world assumption** for Datalog.