Second-order Confidence in Supervaluationism

Jonas KargeJonas Karge

Jonas Karge
Second-order Confidence in Supervaluationism
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, July 2023

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KurzfassungAbstract
Recently, Wilcox (2020) argued against the so-called wide interval view and in favor of the principle of indifference as the correct response to unspecific evidence. Embedded in a formal model of the beliefs of an agent, the former presupposes imprecise probabilities and the latter numerically precise degrees of belief. His argument is illustrated by a thought experiment that comes with a fundamental intuition. According to Wilcox, the wide interval view is incompatible with this intuition and, thus, undermined. In contrast, I show that the intuition behind the thought experiment is, in fact, compatible with the wide interval view if it is embedded into a specific conception of imprecise probabilities as model of belief. This conception is an extension of a framework which I call modified supervaluationism (MSV) and which I recently presented elsewhere Karge (2021). To accommodate the thought experiment’s fundamental intuition, it introduces a notion of second-order beliefs.
Projekt:Project: ScaDS.AI
Forschungsgruppe:Research Group: Computational LogicComputational Logic

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09652-7.

@article{K2023,
  author    = {Jonas Karge},
  title     = {Second-order Confidence in Supervaluationism},
  journal   = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
  publisher = {Springer},
  year      = {2023},
  month     = {July},
  doi       = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09652-7}
}